

Successes and failures of conflict governance: Lessons from Aceh, Indonesia and Moro, Philippines

Muhammad Nasir Badu^{1*)}, Syafhendry², Christine B. Tenorio³

¹Department of International Relations, Universitas Hasanuddin, Indonesia

²Department of Government Science, Universitas Islam Riau, Indonesia

³Departement of Public Administration, Bukidnon State University, Philippines

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze ethnic conflict management in Aceh (Indonesia) and Moro (Philippines) conflicts. The Aceh conflict was considered resolved after the signing of the Helsinki agreement, which was mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), an international NGO based in Finland, on 15 August 2005 between Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Meanwhile, the Moro (Philippines) conflict is still ongoing despite the TRIPOLI agreement signed and mediated by the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on 23 December 1976 and also with the MILF in 2001. This research method uses a qualitative approach. Primary data was obtained through interviews with figures who were considered competent in the Aceh conflict and the Moro conflict. The results of this study show that CMI in Aceh has succeeded in changing the situation of ethnic conflict into a situation that can reduce and reduce escalation and direct conflict actors towards conflict resolution. Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building have been played well by CMI involving the international community such as ASEAN and the European Union to manage the conflict. Meanwhile, in Moro the OIC failed to bring the conflict actors to solve their problems. The Philippine government lacks a robust vision, framework, and the necessary political will to effectively address the Moro conflict, which is of concern to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Keywords: ethno-nationalism, conflict governance, Aceh, Moro

*) Corresponding Author

E-mail : nasirbadu8@gmail.com

Introduction

One of the internal issues that embodies an international dimension and occurs in a country is ethnic conflict (Blagojevic, 2010; Easterly, 2001; Harff, 2018; Stein, 2019). An empirical study showed that ethnic conflict is one part of 101 armed conflicts that took place from 1989 to now, whereby only six percent of those conflicts were inter-country conflicts and the rest, about ninety-four percent, occurred within a country. Conflicts such as these, commonly referred to as identity conflicts with a focus on ethnicity at its core, are a big threat to stability and peace, be it on the level of individuals, local, communal, or even international peace (Harris & Reilly, 2000).

Since 1975, ethnic conflict has become a serious matter in several Southeast Asian countries. The persistent conflicts of this nature indicate that some of the nations in the region are relatively weak and problematic on the issue of legitimacy. Ethnic conflicts that occur in Southeast Asia region are characterized by armed separatism, rebellion or terrorism toward the main land (Tan, 2000). The movements in Southeast Asia region are clashes between dominant groups, which have their own cultural values, with subordinate groups that also have their own religious-cultural identity. This in turn

is related to the formation of a national identity, which is very much influenced by the values held by the dominant group whereas the minority group tend to be ostracized. For instance, the armed Islamic movement in the Southern Philippines and in Aceh. In Aceh, a peace accord was signed by both the Indonesian government and *GAM* on 15 August 2005 (Tan, 2007) but in the Southern of the Philippines is still ongoing. In the Southern Philippines where Moro Muslims became an anomaly in a country dominated by Catholics, who are influenced by American and Spanish culture (Jinadu, 2007).

The case in Aceh of Indonesia, which showed a domination of culture by the majority group against the minority. The pride in their history and traditions as well as loyalty to Islam are the factors that make the people of Aceh feel that they are different than other Indonesians, who they consider as *abangan* and dominated by the Java ethnic, who controls the bureaucracy and military. In general, the cases mentioned above arose due to a sense of serious alienation within minority groups and this is the root problem that originated the desire to separate and form their own country (Jinadu, 2007). The factor considered to be most influential in an ethnic conflict is the factor of economy. (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000) explained that with the advent of a broad economic and social injustice perspective such as resource, social and political distribution in economy, ethnic conflicts are prolonged. Not only (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Tarja, 2000; Wayne, 2002) viewed the matter from the same standpoint. (Addison & Murshed, 2002) too considered that ethnic conflict in general is caused by a problem of the economy.

Generally, political factor as the root of conflict embodies a combination of the economic and cultural factors (Badu, 2011; Kriesi et al., 2012). This particular factor refers to a country's role as the main player in creating the peace and harmony needed by its people. A conflict is an indication of the country's failure to play its role well (Buendia, 2005; Kira, 2003; Shaun, 2004; Murdoch & Sandler, 2002). Although powerful, such a country will not be able to uphold the law and order, let alone provide for main services. The stagnation of economy, the collapse of services and the low level of populations income. This fact will finally reveal itself once the community is restless and should it be left to continue it will create disorder and eventually, cause a more serious outcome such as an insurgence or riot. What's worse is when in such situation, the government ignores the already „ostracized“ groups up to the point where these groups emerge to put up a fight. As for the cultural factor as trigger of conflict, it exists due to the cultural differences between various groups. These differences tend to be inherited directly from one generation to the next and is prone to further differentiation. This causes tension and embed hostility among the culturally diverse groups. Opposing groups or groups that feel challenged or alienated will then merge and see themselves as a member of a common culture and so struggle together to achieve cultural autonomy. Conflicts that are driven by primordial ethnic force such as this are inevitable and difficult to overcome. Ethnicity is a cultural inheritance of a subconscious life, which is determined by ones origins and other bio-social determining factors.

These conflicts have brought about a significant impact on the safety of the population, which have caused violation of human rights, consequently insurmountable death toll, reducing economic productivity and causing various problems of the living condition (Murdoch & Sandler, 2002). The matter is worsen when conflict such as these persists over a long period of time. The Aceh conflict (Indonesia), for instance, started since 1953, and the Moro conflict around 1935 (Murdoch & Sandler, 2002; Ross, 2004). All sorts of efforts were made to reduce the effect of such ethnic conflicts, so that there

will be minimal negative impact on the country. The efforts include, for example, instilling cooperative and persuasive measures through negotiations and dialogues, as well as other efforts ranging from offering autonomy packages to taking coercive measures such as the use of military might. Alas, these conflicts persist.

There were not only internal efforts being made for there were also international endeavors to resolve the region's ethnic conflicts. For instance, the Aceh conflict resolution involved the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) in 1999 but failed. Later, the Aceh conflict involved yet another international non-governmental organization (NGO), Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), which is based in Helsinki, Finland. The CMI played its role well as a mediator between the two conflicting actors, so well that the Indonesian government and *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)* finally agreed to sign a peace accord on 15 August 2005. In contrast, the Moro conflict, although the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) has been involved since the first negotiation on 15-23 December 1976, which resulted in the Tripoli agreement, and involved third parties such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the United States, the conflict remained even until now.

Research Method

This descriptive qualitative research explores a comparative analysis of conflict management outcomes, focusing on the successes observed in Aceh and the failures experienced in Moro. The research utilizes a qualitative approach that combines primary and secondary data sources to provide a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play. Primary data was collected through interviews with key figures knowledgeable about the Aceh and Moro conflicts, while secondary data was obtained from an extensive literature review that included historical records, official reports, and scholarly publications. To strengthen the research design, data triangulation was introduced, combining multiple sources to increase validity. A comparative analysis framework was established to systematically compare the factors that contributed to success in Aceh with those that led to failure in Moro. The research also incorporates longitudinal analysis to track the evolution of conflict management strategies over time, taking into account the adaptability of existing approaches in response to changing circumstances. Cross-cultural sensitivity was also recognized, by exploring how cultural, historical and socio-political contexts influence conflict resolution approaches in each region. Thematic coding and content analysis techniques were applied to identify recurring themes and patterns in the qualitative data. In addition, the research utilized the case study method to explore in depth the contextual details, events and key actors.

Results and Discussion

Aceh and Moro Conflicts

The conflicts in Aceh and Moro, in reality, have been going on for a very long time, even long before Indonesia and the Philippines gained independence. During the colonial era, Aceh fought the Dutch while the Moros were preoccupied with the invading Spanish and Americans. But the modern organized form of movement in Aceh and Moro have just started around 1970's (Schulze, 2004; Ross, 2004; Muslim, 1994), (Nafzyger, E Wayne, 2002; Rivera, 1994; Anwar & Maris, 2005; Tan, 2007). The task to significantly determine the cause of conflict in Aceh and Moro is not an easy one for the causes themselves are complex. The indicators no longer point to just one indication but it involves various factors. Furthermore, these factors are interrelated, so much so that there are no specific segments. Economic factor, political factor, socio-cultural factor, religious factor and historical factor are all the main causing factor,

whereby they are all intertwined and accumulate to bring about dissatisfaction among the people, who all this while thought that their country was their protector and advocate of their interests Frances Stewart in (Murdoch & Sandler, 2002). The people of the two territories felt alienated, ostracized and that they were put on the periphery level in the polity system. This encouraged their desires to break away and establish their own country. The governments of Indonesia and the Philippines are considered to have failed in playing their roles.

Historical Background of Free Aceh Movement

The Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) was established in 4th December 1976, which became the basis of *GAM*'s (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*) foundation in the 1980's by Tengku Hasan in Tiro – an early modern movement of the Aceh conflict with the purpose to separate from Indonesia. The *GAM* movement period was made to be the mould for the modern Aceh conflict (Ross, 2004), (Stephen Ryan, 1990) and (Nafzyger, E Wayne, 2002)). Actually, the armed *GAM* movement period would have not occurred if the Indonesian government of 1953, when the Daud Beureuh struggle erupted, were more accommodative and accepted the aspirations and demands of Aceh's people at the time. Jakarta's mistakes under the rule of Soekarno in overlooking the condition in Aceh at the time was in fact, ignoring Aceh's demands and thinking that the problem in Aceh was a trivial one, and that it can be solved using military power. Even though the Indonesian government were well aware of the contribution in history made by Aceh as an integral part of Indonesia's struggle to establish an independent Indonesia, they misjudged the capacity for confrontation by the people of Aceh. Not only that, Aceh's momentous contribution in supporting Indonesia's fight against the Dutch also demonstrated that Aceh was never separated from the united Indonesia.

The turn over of Indonesia to Soeharto's rule in 1967 were also apparently unfruitful in bringing about significant changes in terms of improving the condition in Aceh. In fact, the situation worsen due to the implementation of Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) or Military Operation Territory in 1988. This repressive approach all New Order did not elevate the problem, instead it verified that the people of Aceh are indeed at the periphery level and that they are being alienated. This natural resource rich territory could not even benefit from its own riches because they were channeled to Jakarta and to a certain extent, some were benefited by local corrupted Aceh officers. The fall of the New Order in 1998 further strengthened *GAM* as a movement organization, which gained extensive support from the community of Aceh. *GAM*'s existence and platform became more and more real. This made the Indonesian government restless and they began to pay more attention by offering autonomous options, fair monetary allocations, ending DOM and other persuasive methods of gaining Aceh's support.

The Aceh conflict, which is known through the existence of *GAM* as a symbol of struggle, up until before the signing of the Helsinki treaty on 15 August 2005, can not only be seen in terms of religion but also in terms of history, socio-culture, political interests, nationalism and economy. All of these factors are interrelated, making it more complex and difficult to untangle. Referring to only one factor as the main cause can no longer be used as an approach. Apart from that, other factors that also affected the Aceh conflict is the hatred felt by the people of Aceh towards the Java domination, the absurdly high level of corruption and forays as well as poverty, the high level of unemployment and also the lag felt by Aceh's community in the long period of a century (Anwar & Maris, 2005; Jinadu, 2007).

Historical Background Moro Conflict

Before Spanish colonization, the Moro people were part of several sultanates and Muslim principalities in the southern Philippines, particularly in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. These sultanates were established as early as the 15th century, influenced by traders and missionaries from neighboring Islamic regions. Islam arrived in the region through Arab and Malay traders and missionaries, significantly before the arrival of Spanish colonizers. This led to the establishment of Islam as the dominant religion in these areas, shaping the cultural and social fabric of the Moro people. Unlike other parts of the Philippines, the Moro regions strongly resisted Spanish colonization. For over 300 years, the Moro sultanates maintained their independence, engaging in frequent conflict with Spanish forces. The Moro people's Islamic faith and distinct cultural practices set them apart from the predominantly Christian population in the rest of the Philippines. This distinction played a significant role in their resistance to colonial and later, national assimilation efforts.

The foundation of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in mid-1971 as a result of the Jabidah tragedy in Corregidor on 18 March 1968, which took the lives of 28 Muslims whom the majority was of the Tausug ethnic from Sulu and Tawi- Tawi, triggered the initial momentum of the Moro's modern movement to separate from the Philippines as an independent race. Historically speaking, this was a reflection of the Moros' true identity that were not actually a part of the Philippines. To the Moros, their sovereignty was accomplished long before the country, Philippines was formed. So it is not surprising that even until today, the call for independence is still the priority to several factions of the movement group that arose after MNLF such as MILF, Abu Sayaf and other small groups.

The conflict's roots trace back to Spanish colonial times when the Moro people, predominantly Muslim inhabitants of the southern Philippines, resisted Spanish rule. This resistance continued against subsequent American and Filipino administrations. The Moro National Liberation Front was formed in the late 1960s, under the leadership of Nur Misuari. It was a response to perceived marginalization and discrimination against the Moro people by the predominantly Christian government. The conflict that occurred in Moro is able to exist due to the suppression, exploitation, disregard and discrimination experienced by the Moros for a very long time, as long as they have been with the Philippines. The Moros' suffering is related to economic exclusion and poverty, political dominance, restricted identity including religion, territory and culture, as well as the threat to peace and actions taken by the government of Philippines itself in not paying due attention to the Moros, which instigated the armed movement of the Moros. Also, Muslim viewed that internally, the Moro struggle is not because of an internal disagreement among the Moros themselves such as a struggle for power among the Moro leaders nor is it caused by the wish of younger generation Moro to seize power from their predecessors.

The MNLF sought an independent Moro state or autonomous region due to grievances over economic inequalities, political marginalization, and cultural and religious discrimination. The conflict saw numerous violent clashes between the MNLF and the Philippine military, leading to significant loss of life and displacement of people. In addition, another issue that has also become an essential basis for their desire for independence is the high death toll. The Moro conflict has sacrificed over 60,000 souls, and that is only between 1969 to 1976, plus 54,000 more injured and around 350,00 families losing their homes. Data from 1977 to 2008 indicates a significant increase.

From 1975 to 2002, not including data from 2003 to 2008, the economic loss has reached a staggering 5 to 10 trillion pesos every year.

The Success Conflict Governance in Aceh

The signing of the Helsinki agreement on 15 August 2005 between the government of Indonesia and separatist group, GAM was not only caused by both sides wanting to make peace but there were also many other factors that came into play. The following analysis attempts to illustrate what ever factors that supported and influenced the success of peace in Aceh, which were mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative lead by Marti Ahtisari.

The Government of Indonesia

The administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla succeeded in bringing peace to Aceh after the signing of the Helsinki Agreement on 15 August 2005. The success cannot be separated from the political will of Indonesian government that genuinely wanted to solve the conflict. When compared to previous administrations, the accommodative and cooperative stance demonstrated by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's and Jusuf Kalla's administrations were more significant and effective. A serious approach was taken as well as a clear platform and vision observable of their management. The measures taken by the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla lead to the internationalization of Aceh's conflict management, whereby they invited a third party, CMI to help and mediate the negotiation between the Indonesian government and separatist group, GAM.

The method was indeed not a new approach for previously, during the administration of Abdulrahman Wahid, a similar measure of inviting a third party, the Henry Dunant Centre was implemented. But in the end, it falls through. Internationalization of Aceh's problems was also done by the Indonesian government when Aceh was hit by the tsunami. Aid from the international community was received directly as well as indirectly. The negotiations were not trouble-free. The Indonesian government wittingly showed its preparedness to fulfill all of GAM's demands, which seemed very risky because there will be consequences from having a country within a country, be it in the organization of Aceh's local government or political participation or even the economy as a whole. Another measure taken by the government of Indonesia was to carry out the provision of the Memorandum of Understanding, which specified the retreat of military forces from Aceh. The Indonesian government's seriousness was proven by the gradual withdrawal of 31,681 military and police officers from Aceh by January 2006. The numbers is progressively increasing even as we speak. This is truly a commitment that have not been seen before from previous administrations, which relied more on military approach in managing the conflict in Aceh.

Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka-GAM)

The separatist group, *GAM*, not very much different from the Indonesian government, wittingly showed their preparedness to negotiate with the later to manage the conflict. On the whole, *GAM* had always followed the government's lead in discussing the question at hand. *GAM* was involved in each and every process of the negotiation with the Indonesian government. It was on 4 December 1976 that *GAM*, under the leadership of Hasan, in Tiro declared its desire for independence that is to separate from Indonesian governance. The resolution was made due to the injustice suffered by the people of Aceh brought about by Indonesian government. This shows a

dialectic of thinking whereby if justice and peace prevail in Aceh, then the insurgency and conflict would cease in Aceh. *GAM*'s desire for peace was also apparent in its willingness to carry out all of the provisions in the MoU of the Helsinki Agreement such as the disarmament of *GAM*. As of January, 1018 weaponries have been handed over by *GAM* to the Aceh Monitoring Mission for disposal. *GAM* is also prepared to no longer carry out disturbances that can worsen the situation.

Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)

The recognition of CMI as a third party, trusted by both sides in disagreement, for the management of Aceh conflict showed that the CMI, lead by Marti Ahtisari, is indeed a world class NGO that is capable and competent in conflict management. CMI has been tested as having a reputation in handling conflicts of various conflicting regions of the world such as the case in Kosovo and Yugoslavia. CMI's experience of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building in conflict management of various nations and its neutral disposition as a third party attracted the government of Indonesia and separatist group *GAM* to invite CMI as their mediator. Some of the considerations made to assess CMI's qualification in managing the conflict in Aceh, which succeeded in bridging the peace process were: professionalism in deciding the measures for the peace process, by developing a sense of commitment between the two conflicting sides with a slogan "nothing is agreed until everything agreed"; and standards that relies on multi-track diplomacy that invited the European Union for funding as well as ASEAN in performing the various tasks of the Aceh Monitoring Mission.

Tsunami Disaster

A tsunami which devastated Aceh and caused more than 200,000 fatalities with immeasurable loss of property, is another factor that brought success to the peace process in Aceh. The tsunami became a shared basis that made possible the Indonesian government and *GAM* to begin the peace negotiations. Both sides demonstrated sympathy for the victims of tsunami. Both sides realized how helping tsunami victims is far more important than prolonging a conflict. Furthermore, the international community was also present in Aceh for humanitarian reasons, which made both sides aware that they did not want to go to war.

The Failure of Moro Conflict Governance

In contrast to Aceh, the Moro conflict is still ongoing. Over the years, several attempts at peace agreements were made. A significant breakthrough was the 1996 peace agreement, which led to the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Despite these agreements, splinter groups and continuing dissatisfaction among some Moro groups have led to ongoing instability and periodic violence. Furthermore, Despite the Tripoli agreement being signed by both parties that is the government of Philippines and separatist group MNLF in 1976, and the government of Philippines and MILF in 2001, which was mediated by the Organization of Islamic Conference. Moreover, Moro conflict third party roles played by neighboring, friendly states in Southeast Asia and local, regional and international NGOs in upholding a cease-fire agreement and allowing negotiations to proceed with Malaysian, Libya and Indonesia facilitation on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in brokering cease-fires and subsequent agreements to try to resolve the underlying conflicts (Hopmann & Lustenberger, 2011).

At the time had been formed the International Monitoring Team led by Malaysia and its Civilian Protection Component, composed largely of international and local NGOs, in implementing a cease-fire agreement after the most recent outbreak of violent conflict in 2008 that resulted from a ruling by the Philippines Supreme Court that rejected a negotiated agreement on - ancestral domains reached between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The subsequent violence proved deadly and produced a huge number of IDPs in Mindanao. As with the success in Aceh, the failure of resolving the Moro conflict is also attributed to various factors (Hopmann & Lustenberger, 2011).

The Government of the Philippines

Galtung and Horowitz revealed that a country, where ethnic conflict occur, is incapable of being a neutral arbiter but instead it becomes a part of the conflicting parties. For that reason, it is very impractical to rely on the role of that country to manage its own ethnic conflict. This statement describes how sometimes a country, where ethnic conflict occur, can turn a conflict into an arena for power struggle driven by economic or even political factor. It is obvious that the government is insincere in managing the conflict considering that peace is so hard to attain. It seems that the government is half-heartedly handling the conflict.

The persisting conflict in Moro is caused by at least three things, namely: weak political will from both conflicting sides, absence of a good framework and ambiguous vision of the conflict management by the Philippines" government. Weak political will from the government of the Philippines has long been a feature, ever since Ferdinand Marcos" administration. Even so, after signing the new agreement, the Philippines government often resort to military approach to control the outcome of the agreement. What happened was that it triggered new tensions between the two sides. Persuasiveness was non-existent in the part of the government and the same was also true for the implementation of mutually consented programmes contained in the agreement.

Take for instance the formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) during the administration of Corazon C. Aquino in 1990, which ended with suspicion of Nur Misuari and his arrest. Later in 1996, another agreement was made with MNLF under the administration of Ramos but that too was doomed to failure. Subsequently, the Philippines government began negotiations with the new MILF since the administration of Joseph Estrada and now, Arroyo. A very disturbing event that unfolded was when Joseph Estrada launched an all-out war against MILF in March 2000. It consequently made Arroyo"s job harder.

Rebel Groups

The continuance of the conflict in Moro is also due to the economy-oriented separatist group. In another word, there are indications that the separatist group, especially their leaders, are purposely prolonging the conflict with the Philippines government, turning it into a platform to gain roll-over funds from the government and the support of the international community. An example of this is the case of Nur Misuari of the ARMM, who was considered to have misused development funds for the southern region under ARMM"s authority. The development of South Philippines, a region under the control of ARMM, was not implemented as it should. In fact, it tended to be marginalized. The many number of separatist groups in Moro is another reason as to why the Moro conflict is difficult to resolve. The interests of each separatist group are different. The

negotiation between the Philippines government and MNLF, for example, was settled but then along came other separatist groups such as the MILF and Abu Sayyaf, and other groups like the Rajah Solaiman Movement and Abu Sofia Group. Not forgetting the Cordilleras, another separatist set, in the northern region of the Philippines.

Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

The OIC as a third party in resolving the Moro conflict is considered not to have much leverage in bringing the Philippine government and the MNLF/MILF to peace. This is due to the existence of the OIC as an intergovernmental organization that does not have the flexibility to resolve the Moro conflict. Apart from that, the OIC is very slow and this organization does not have adequate conflict resolution tools. Not only that, its conflict resolution function only facilitates the parties in conflict without being able to pressure both parties in conflict to have a high commitment to resolving the conflict to create real peace.

The size of OIC clearly cannot assure a good mediation. Many times over, the OIC acted as mediator between separatist groups, MNLF and also MILF, and the government of Philippines but to no avail. Peace was not restored. There are many factors as to why the OIC is an organization incapable of resolving the conflict in the Philippines. Those factors include the fact that the OIC is a governmental international organization, whereby its agendas only facilitate the conflict between its members. Even if called to resolve a conflict, such as the conflict in Moro, OIC's role will ultimately be the opposite of maximal. Its official status makes OIC burdened with rigid diplomatic protocols, which indeed have sensitive effects on any progress of mediation. A governmental international body such as the OIC is limited by time. The OIC also failed to invite and take full advantage of the potential of its members to control the peace process in Moro. After the signing of the peace treaty, there were no peace building controlled by a third party. Consequently, leaving the treaty to be interpreted by the conflicting parties themselves.

Current Situation of the Moro

The situation between the Moro groups in the Philippines and the Philippine government has been a complex and evolving issue. The Moro people, primarily Muslim, are based in the southern Philippines, and have a long history of seeking greater autonomy or independence from the predominantly Catholic Philippine state. The creation of BARMM was a significant step towards peace and was intended to provide greater autonomy to the Moro people in the region. Despite the establishment of BARMM, challenges remain. These include issues related to governance, development, and security. The region has been plagued by poverty, underdevelopment, and occasional violence, including clashes between different groups and issues related to extremist factions.

Both the Philippine government and various Moro groups, including the MILF, continue to work towards sustaining peace in the region. This includes efforts to improve governance, economic development, and security in BARMM. There are other Moro groups, such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and various smaller factions, some of which have not fully supported the peace process. This has sometimes led to tensions and conflicts within the region. The peace process and the development of BARMM have received support from international entities, including various countries and organizations that view the establishment of BARMM as a positive step towards peace and stability in the region.

Conclusion

This research shows that the successful resolution of the Aceh conflict was due to the role played by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) that involved European Union (EU) and ASEAN and the high political will of Indonesian government and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in solving the conflict, as well as the general Aceh community in upholding the peace process. CMI in Aceh has been successful to change the ethnic conflict situation to one, which can defeat and reduce escalation as well as sending the conflict actors on their way towards conflict resolution. The opposite has happened in the Moro conflict case, which even until now is still happening. These conflicts have brought a huge impact on the peace of its people resulting in human rights violation, higher death tolls, hampering economic productivity and the delay of environmental problems. OIC as a third party has failed to bring the conflict actors to solve their problems. OIC could not force the government of Philippines and MNLF/MILF in upholding the peace process as well as the government of the Philippines and MNLF/MILF have not sturdy vision, framework and political will in solving the Moro conflict.

References

- Badu, M. N. (2011). *Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Study of Aceh (Indonesia) and Moro (Philippines)*.
- Blagojevic, B. (2010). Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework. *Journal of Global Change & Governance*, 3(1).
- Buendia, R. G. (2005). The state- Moro armed conflict in the Philippines Unresolved national question or question of governance? *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 13(1), 109–138. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370508434252>
- Dewi Fortuna Anwar, & Masri Maris. (2005). *Konflik kekerasan internal tinjauan sejarah, ekonomi politik, dan kebijakan di Asia Pasifik*. Universitas Indonesia Library; Yayasan Obor Indonesia. <https://lib.ui.ac.id>
- Easterly, W. (2001). Can institutions resolve ethnic conflict? *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 49(4), 687–706.
- Harff, B. (2018). *Ethnic conflict in world politics*. Routledge.
- Hopmann, P. Terrence and Philipp Lustenberger. (2011). *Conflict Management in Mindanao*, the Paper presented for International Association for Conflict Management Conference, in Istanbul, Turkey. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1872224
- James C. Murdoch, & Todd Sandler. (2002). *Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial Spillovers—JAMES C. MURDOCH, TODD SANDLER, 2002*. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002702046001006>
- Jinadu, L. A. (2007). *Explaining & managing ethnic conflict in Africa: Towards a cultural theory of democracy*. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University [u.a.].
- Kay, Kira. (2003). *The New Humanitarian: The Henry Dunant Center and the Aceh Peace Negotiations. WWS Case Study*.
- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Dolezal, M., Helbling, M., Höglinger, D., Hutter, S., & Wüest, B. (2012). *Political conflict in western Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- Levine, Shaun D. (2004). *Confronting the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: Insights into GAM's recent decision to drop its independence stance, exploring GAM's shift towards autonomy. Tesis MA. Political Science, Northern Illinois University: T.pt*.

- Marsella, A. J. (2005). Culture and conflict: Understanding, negotiating, and reconciling conflicting constructions of reality. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 29(6), 651–673. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.07.012>
- Muslim, M. A. (1994). *The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative*. Office of the President and College of Public Affairs, Mindanao State University.
- Nafzyger, E Wayne. (2002). *The prevention of humanitarian emergencies /*. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/473012?ln=en>
- Paul Collier, & Anke Hoeffler. (2000). *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/18853>
- Peter Harris, & Ben Reilly. (2000). *Demokrasi dan konflik yang mengakar: Sejumlah pilihan untuk negosiator*. IDEA.
- Rivera. (1994). *Armed challenges to the Philippines government: Protracted war or political settlement? Southeast Asian Affairs*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Ross, M. L. (2004). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases. *International Organization*, 58(1), 35–67. https://econpapers.repec.org/article/cupintorg/v_3a58_3ay_3a2004_3ai_3a01_3ap_3a35-67_5f58.htm
- Schulze, K. E. (2004). *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*.
- Stein, A. A. (2019). Ethnicity, extraterritoriality, and international conflict. In *Affect, Interest and Political Entrepreneurs in Ethnic and Religious Conflicts* (pp. 40–58). Routledge.
- Stephen Ryan. (1990). *Ethnic conflict and international relations* | WorldCat.org. <https://search.worldcat.org/title/ethnic-conflict-and-international-relations/oclc/21950281>
- Tan, A. (2000). *Armed rebellion in the ASEAN states: Persistence and implications*. Australian National University.
- Tan, A. T. H. (2007). Terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia. In A. T. H. Tan (Ed.), *A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia* (pp. 3–25). Edward Elgar Publishing. <http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84881842216&partnerID=8YFLogxK>
- Tony Addison, & S Mansood Murshed. (2002). *Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking*. <https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/joupea/v39y2002i4p487-501.html>
- Vayrynen, Tarja. (2000). *Culture and international conflict resolution: A critical analysis of the work of John Burton—James Madison University*.